Picture a head of year in May, a week before data drop. On the screen is a spreadsheet of predicted grades, and a column of cells that have turned red. A senior leader has asked for the percentage of pupils “on track” to rise by five points before the governors’ meeting. Nobody has asked anyone to lie.
Then the small decisions start. A borderline mark gets rounded up because “she’s nearly there”. A piece of coursework gets a little more help than the guidance strictly allows. A conversation with a family about whether their son might be “happier somewhere else” happens a term earlier than it might have. Each step feels defensible on its own. Few of them feel like ethical decisions at all.
So why do decent, committed people in schools sometimes end up doing things they would never have signed up to in September? The research points away from the comfortable idea of a few bad apples and towards the way targets and pressure are built.
An old warning about indicators
In the 1970s the social scientist Donald Campbell set out what is now often called Campbell’s law: “The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor.” In the same paper he wrote that achievement tests “are, in fact, highly corruptible indicators” (Campbell, reprinted 2011).
What the evidence shows about goals and cheating
Brian Jacob and Steven Levitt built a statistical method for spotting suspicious answer patterns in Chicago’s public schools. Their 2003 study in the Quarterly Journal of Economics estimated that serious cases of teacher or administrator cheating occurred in at least 4 to 5 per cent of elementary classrooms each year, and that the frequency of cheating appeared to respond strongly to relatively small changes in incentives. That is one district, so it says nothing certain about other systems. But it describes ordinary staff responding to the stakes in front of them.
Laboratory work fills in part of the mechanism. In an experiment reported in the Academy of Management Journal, Maurice Schweitzer, Lisa Ordóñez and Bambi Douma (2004) found that people with unmet goals were more likely to behave unethically, by overstating their performance, than people simply asked to do their best. The pattern held with and without financial rewards, and it was strongest for people who had fallen just short of the target. The red cell that is one mark away, in other words, may be the most dangerous cell on the spreadsheet.
Closer to home for British schools, Ofsted commissioned YouGov to survey 1,018 teaching professionals in England about off-rolling, defined as removing a pupil from the roll without a formal exclusion, or encouraging a parent to do so, “when the removal is primarily in the interests of the school rather than in the best interests of the pupil”. About a quarter of respondents said they knew of off-rolling in their current or a previous school, and teachers most often named league table position as the main driver (Ofsted, 2019). These are perceptions, not a measure of prevalence, but they show where staff feel the pressure coming from.
The case for caution about the caution
It would be easy to conclude that targets are poison. The authors of the best known critique, “Goals Gone Wild” (Ordóñez et al., 2009), argued that goal setting should be treated like “a prescription-strength medication” with side effects that include narrowed focus, more risk taking and unethical behaviour. Edwin Locke and Gary Latham, the architects of goal-setting theory, replied sharply. Their rejoinder argued that the critique leaned on anecdotes and unrepresentative citations, and that they had already published most of the pitfalls it listed.
Both sides have a point. Challenging goals do improve effort and performance in many settings, and the most dramatic stories of goals gone wrong are case studies, not controlled evidence. What the debate leaves school leaders with is a set of conditions: the risks seem greatest when goals are narrow, the stakes are high, the measure is easy to influence and oversight is thin. That describes a fair amount of school data.
Why it doesn’t feel like a choice
The idea I find most useful here is ethical fading. Ann Tenbrunsel and David Messick (2004) described how self-deception lets people act in their own interest while believing their moral principles are intact, so that the ethical side of a decision “fades” into the background. Among the enablers they identify are euphemistic language and the slippery slope of decisions made one small step at a time.
Schools are fluent in gentle language, often for kind reasons. “A fresh start.” “Not the right fit.” Sometimes these phrases describe exactly what a child needs. The risk is that the same words can carry a decision that is really about the school’s numbers, without anyone saying so. Add a series of small steps and you can arrive somewhere serious without ever feeling a line was crossed.
There is no neat solution in the phrase “best interests of the pupil” either. When William Frick (2011) interviewed secondary school administrators about it, the phrase resonated, but their actual judgements were more complicated than following a single rule. A principle helps. It does not decide for you.
Questions worth asking before the next data drop
Ordóñez and colleagues ended their paper with a “warning label” of questions for managers. My own adaptation for schools would look something like this:
- What does this target leave out? What happens to pupils who will never count as on track?
- What happens to someone who falls just short? If the honest answer is a difficult meeting, we have built the conditions the Schweitzer study describes.
- Which words are we using for hard decisions? If a phrase would sound different said plainly to the parents, say it plainly in the meeting first.
- Who checks the numbers, and who checks the checkers? Jacob and Levitt’s own recommendations included simple safeguards such as independent invigilation of tests.
- Are we modelling the behaviour we ask for? Staff notice how leaders respond to bad news, a theme I have written about in behavioural integrity in school leadership.
None of this means abandoning data. A school that never looks at its numbers will miss children who are struggling. But a target is never morally neutral. It shapes what people notice, what they feel they can say and what they quietly do when the deadline arrives. If staff feel unable to say “this number is wrong” without risk, the problem is partly one of psychological safety, and partly one of how the system was designed.
There is a parallel with children. Heavy pressure on pupils can produce compliance without commitment, as I explored in rules without pressure and in why behaviour systems don’t build character. Adults are unlikely to be immune.
So the question for leaders is not whether our staff are honest. Most of them are. It is whether the systems we build make honesty easy, or quietly make it expensive.
References
- Campbell, D. T. (1976/2011). Assessing the impact of planned social change. Occasional Paper Series, Paper #8, Dartmouth College; reprinted in Journal of MultiDisciplinary Evaluation, 7(15), 3-43. https://doi.org/10.56645/jmde.v7i15.297
- Frick, W. C. (2011). Practicing a professional ethic: Leading for students’ best interests. American Journal of Education, 117(4), 527-562. https://doi.org/10.1086/660757
- Jacob, B. A., & Levitt, S. D. (2003). Rotten apples: An investigation of the prevalence and predictors of teacher cheating. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3), 843-877. https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530360698441 (working paper version: NBER w9413)
- Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (2009). Has goal setting gone wild, or have its attackers abandoned good scholarship? Academy of Management Perspectives, 23(1), 17-23. https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.2009.37008000
- Ofsted (2019). Exploring the issue of off-rolling (research by YouGov). https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/off-rolling-exploring-the-issue
- Ordóñez, L. D., Schweitzer, M. E., Galinsky, A. D., & Bazerman, M. H. (2009). Goals gone wild: The systematic side effects of overprescribing goal setting. Academy of Management Perspectives, 23(1), 6-16. https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.2009.37007999
- Schweitzer, M. E., Ordóñez, L., & Douma, B. (2004). Goal setting as a motivator of unethical behavior. Academy of Management Journal, 47(3), 422-432. https://doi.org/10.2307/20159591
- Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Messick, D. M. (2004). Ethical fading: The role of self-deception in unethical behavior. Social Justice Research, 17(2), 223-236. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SORE.0000027411.35832.53


